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The paper analyses whether communication and actual interventions in FX markets 
are successful in moving exchange rates over the medium- to long-run. It compares 
empirical evidence based on time-series analysis with that obtained from an event-
study approach. Both the time-series approach based on option contracts and the 
event-study methodology yield compelling evidence that communication and actual 
interventions tend to be successful in moving exchange rates in the desired direction 
contemporaneously as well as over the medium- to long-term. This finding is 
consistent with recent work on microstructure models that emphasises the importance 
of dynamic effects of news and fundamentals on exchange rates. 
 
JEL: E61; E58; F31. 
Keywords: communication; exchange rate; intervention; policy; time-series analysis; 
event-study methodology; United States; euro area; Japan. 
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Many monetary authorities have moved away from conducting actual interventions and have used 
communication as their primary policy instrument to influence exchange rates when deemed 
necessary and desirable. But is exchange rate communication an effective policy tool? Although 
the literature has found evidence that communication and actual interventions may be effective in 
the short-run, e.g. on the days they occur, from a policy perspective the key question is whether 
such policies prove successful by inducing a permanent, long-term effect on exchange rates. 
The objective of this paper is to tackle this issue by comparing two different methodological 
approaches, one based on standard time-series tools, and the second employing an event-study 
methodology, to analyse the long-term effectiveness of communication and actual intervention 
policies by the United States, Japan and the euro area since 1990. 
Conceptually there are several reasons why such policies may have dynamic effects on FX 
markets. In particular, the rapidly evolving literature on microstructure-based exchange rate 
models suggests that there may be dynamic effects of how exchange rates incorporate new 
information. For instance, Evans and Lyons (2005) show that macroeconomic news have a 
dynamic effect that may take several days to be fully priced into foreign exchange markets. 
Similarly, Sarno and Taylor (2001) argue that monetary authorities may affect markets over a 
prolonged period of time as their interventions may function as a coordination device for market 
participants. 
For the time-series approach, the paper uses an EGARCH framework to analyse the dynamic 
effects of interventions. It focuses on forward-looking indicators of exchange rates, in particular 
implied volatilities, risk reversals and strangles obtained from over-the-counter (OTC) option 
contracts to gauge the longer-term effectiveness of communication and actual interventions. A 
key result is that in particular exchange rate communication has a statistically significant effect on 
forward rates for a horizon up to 6 months, whereas actual interventions by most authorities have 
a significant effect on forward contracts only over a shorter horizon. 
As to the alternative methodology, the paper then analyses the effectiveness of interventions 
using an event-study approach, which is based on the premise that exchange rate communication 
and actual interventions form clusters – i.e. some periods are characterised by frequent oral or 
actual interventions while other extended periods have none – and thus should be treated as such. 
In essence, this event-study approach reduces the dimensionality of measuring the effectiveness 
of events into a single dimension by distinguishing whether an event was ultimately a “success” 
or a “failure” in achieving a particular objective. The advantage of the event-study approach is 
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transforming the variable of interest into such a binomial setting of “success” and “failure”, but 
with the drawback of ignoring the information about the magnitude of exchange rate movements. 
Based on four different success criteria for the event-study approach, the results show that 
communication and actual intervention events were successful and moved the G3 exchange rate 
in the desired direction in the five-day post-event period in 65% to 77% of the cases. This 
directional effect also proves highly persistent and shows a similar rate of “success” as many as 
40 days after the events. Based on a non-parametric sign test, this rate of “success” is 
significantly higher than the unconditional rate of success. Finally, the paper shows that in the 
large majority of events – in all cases more than 80% – interventions succeeded in smoothing the 
exchange rate development, i.e. in reducing the strength of the exchange rate movements that 
took place prior to the event. 
The results prove robust to a number of extensions and robustness tests. Most importantly, 
communication and actual interventions are successful in moving exchange rates in the desired 
direction mostly independently of whether they are supported by monetary policy. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that communication and actual intervention events tend to be more successful 
when they go in the same direction as the pre-event exchange rate trend, if they occur in periods 
of large volatility and uncertainty and when exchange rates are misaligned. They are also more 
successful if they are coordinated domestically and with communication or actual interventions of 
foreign authorities. 
Overall, the evidence based on both methodological approaches suggests that exchange rate 
communication, and to some extent also actual interventions may indeed be an effective policy 
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1.  Introduction 
Are exchange rate communication and actual interventions effective policy tools? The literature is 
very much split on this issue with several studies finding evidence that actual interventions tend to 
help monetary authorities move exchange rates in the desired direction, while other papers show 
that such interventions usually tend to merely raise volatility in foreign exchange markets.
1 An 
important development over the past decade has been that many central banks have moved away 
from trying to manage exchange rates through actual purchases and sales of foreign exchange. 
Most notably, both the US and the euro area authorities basically abandoned actual interventions 
in August 1995 – with two exceptions in September and November 2000. Instead, many 
authorities increasingly use communication as their primary tool to influence exchange rates when 
deemed necessary. Policy-makers (Rubin and Weisberg 2003) have argued and recent empirical 
work (e.g. Jansen and de Haan 2005, Fratzscher 2004) has found that communication may indeed 
have a significant impact on exchange rates, though the literature on this issue is still very much in 
its infancy. 
From a policy perspective, a key question is whether oral interventions and actual interventions 
prove to be successful by inducing a permanent, long-term effect on exchange rates. The premise 
of standard macroeconomic models of exchange rates is that efficient markets should price in all 
relevant information instantaneously so that the contemporaneous effect of any type of news, such 
as interventions, should also constitute the permanent effect. The great majority of the work in the 
literature uses a time-series approach, usually based on a GARCH-type framework at a daily or 
intra-daily frequency, and partly finds some evidence for a contemporaneous effect of actual 
interventions on the conditional mean and in particular on the conditional variance of the 
exchange rate, though such effects cannot be found beyond one or at most a few days (e.g. Baillie 
and Osterberg 1997, Beine, Bénassy-Quéré and Lecourt 2002, Dominguez 2003). Very similar 
conclusions emerge when analysing the effects of important macroeconomic news on exchange 
rates (e.g. Andersen et al. 2003, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005). This finding does not come as a 
surprise as so many different types of news affect foreign exchange markets every day that the 
true permanent, or long-term effect of interventions cannot be measured accurately. This does not 
necessarily imply that interventions are ineffective, but only that exchange rates are sufficiently 
volatile so as to make it impossible to measure their permanent, long-run effects. 
On the contrary, the rapidly evolving literature on microstructure-based exchange rate models, 
building on the work by Peiers (1997), Evans and Lyons (2002) and Osler (2002), suggests that 
there may be dynamic effects of how exchange rates incorporate new information. For instance, 
Evans and Lyons (2005) show that macroeconomic news have a dynamic effect that may take 
several days to be fully priced into foreign exchange markets. They relate this dynamic effect to 
                                                 
1 See the Edison (1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for surveys of the different evidences. 
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time, thereby affecting exchange rate for a number of days. Similarly, in their review of the 
literature on foreign exchange interventions, Sarno and Taylor (2001) argue that monetary 
authorities may affect markets over a prolonged period of time as their interventions may function 
as a coordination device for market participants, or through what they call a coordination channel. 
The question of key policy relevance is therefore precisely how permanent and long-lasting the 
effects of oral and actual interventions are. The objective of this paper is to tackle this issue by 
taking two different methodological approaches, one based on standard time-series tools, and the 
second employing an event-study methodology, to analyse the effectiveness of actual and oral 
interventions by the United States, Japan and the euro area since 1990.
2 Figure 1 illustrates the 
fundamental differences between these two methodologies. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 
US dollar – euro exchange rate in the 40 days before the start and in the 40 days after the end of 
each of the oral intervention events by US and euro area authorities, which will be explained in 
detail below. Note that interventions that aim at reducing the US dollar – euro exchange rate have 
been inverted so that a positive change in the exchange rate after the event in Figure 1 implies that 
the exchange rate has moved in the direction desired by the interventions. 
 
 
Figure 1 indicates that in around 75-80% of the events the exchange rate indeed moved in the 
desired direction in the post-event periods, and only in 20-25% in the undesired direction. Does 
this imply that oral intervention events by US and euro area authorities were “successful” in 
moving the exchange rate in the desired direction? The answer to this question depends on which 
methodological approach one takes to measuring “success”. In essence, time-series approaches 
take into account the precise evolution of exchange rate movements after the events. Figure 1 
shows how highly volatile exchange rates were after as well as before the events. This implies that 
although there is a marked positive mean return to exchange rate movements after the events – 
shown by the fat solid line– statistically one may not be able to reject the hypothesis that the 
changes after the events are different from zero – the fat dotted lines show +/- one standard 
deviation around the mean exchange rate change, with the lower band being continuously below 
zero. By contrast, an event-study approach, in essence, reduces the dimensionality of the analysis 
by transforming exchange rate movements into distinguishing solely between whether an event 
was a “success” or a “failure” and then testing whether the number of “successes” is higher than 
the number of “failures”. 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, also the time-series approaches are event-study approaches. However, for clarity I only 
refer to this alternative approach as event-study approach throughout the paper. 
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For the time-series approach, the paper uses an EGARCH framework to analyse the dynamic 
effects of interventions. Communication, and to some extent also actual interventions are found to 
have a significant contemporaneous impact on exchange rates on the days when these 
interventions take place. However, using cumulated impulse responses obtained from an 
EGARCH model specification shows that the effect of oral and actual interventions cannot be 
shown to be statistically significant beyond two or three days. The paper argues that this finding 
cannot be interpreted as evidence against long-term effectiveness of interventions, but only 
implies that the effect of individual interventions is not sufficiently large to dominate all other 
factors that influence exchange rates. In fact, I show that also the impact of important 
macroeconomic news, such as announcements of US non-farm payroll employment and of the 
German Ifo business confidence index, is not statistically significant beyond a few days. 
To gauge the longer-term effectiveness of communication and actual interventions, the final part 
of the paper turns to forward-looking indicators of exchange rates, in particular implied 
volatilities, risk reversals and strangles obtained from over-the-counter (OTC) option contracts. 
Two key results emerge. First, in particular exchange rate communication has a statistically 
significant effect on forward rates for a horizon up to 6 months, whereas actual interventions by 
most authorities have a significant effect on forward contracts only over a shorter horizon. 
Second, a fundamental difference between communication and actual interventions exists for their 
impact on volatility. Communication mostly reduces historical volatility of spot rates, based on 
the EGARCH specification, as well as the implied volatility of OTC option contracts, whereas 
actual interventions mostly increase both types of volatility. 
As the alternative methodology, the paper then analyses the effectiveness of interventions using an 
event-study approach in sections 4 and 5. This approach is based on the key premise that 
exchange rate communication and actual interventions form clusters – i.e. some periods are 
characterised by frequent oral or actual interventions while other extended periods have none – 
and thus should be treated as such.
3 In essence, this event-study approach then reduces the 
dimensionality of measuring the effectiveness of events into a single dimension by distinguishing 
whether an event was ultimately a “success” or a “failure” in achieving a particular objective. The 
advantage of the event-study approach is that it avoids the problem of “noise” affecting the 
precision of time-series estimates by transforming the variable of interest into such a binomial 
setting of “success” and “failure”, but with the drawback of ignoring the information about the 
magnitude of exchange rate movements. 
Based on four different success criteria, the results show that these oral intervention and actual 
intervention events were successful and moved the exchange rate in the desired direction in the 
five-day post-event period in 65% to 77% of the cases. This directional effect also proves highly 
                                                 
3 MacKinlay (1997) provides a detailed overview of the use of this type of event-study methodology in 
different fields of the literature. 
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persistent and shows a similar rate of “success” as many as 40 days after the events. Based on a 
non-parametric sign test, this rate of “success” is significantly higher than the unconditional rate 
of success. Finally, the paper shows that in the large majority of events – in all cases more than 
80% – interventions succeeded in smoothing the exchange rate development, i.e. in reducing the 
strength of the exchange rate movements that took place prior to the event. 
The results prove robust to a number of extensions and robustness tests. Most importantly, 
communication and actual interventions are successful in moving exchange rates in the desired 
direction mostly independently of whether they are supported by monetary policy. Moreover, for 
US and euro area authorities the results indicate that communication against the prevalent policy 
mantra, i.e. statements that attempt to weaken the domestic currencies, have a substantially larger 
rate of success than those that merely re-affirm the mantra. A formal test using odds ratios in a 
logit-model framework confirms these results and suggests that communication events and actual 
intervention events are more successful in an environment of market uncertainty, when exchange 
rates deviate from equilibrium and when they are coordinated domestically as well as 
internationally with foreign monetary authorities. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data on communication and actual 
intervention before Section 3 presents the empirical results for the time-series methodology. 
Section 4 then discusses the event-study methodology and its caveats. The empirical results of the 
event-study methodology as well as several extensions and robustness tests are given in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Data on Communication and Interventions 
The starting point is to present the data on oral and actual interventions by the monetary 
authorities of the United States, Japan and the euro area, and to discuss some of the caveats. The 
data set for oral and actual interventions is identical to that presented and discussed in detail in 
Fratzscher (2004). This section provides a brief overview of the data and of some of the 
underlying caveats. 
Data on actual interventions is nowadays mostly directly available from the respective central 
banks.
4 A look at the data – a more detailed analysis of which follows below – shows that US and 
euro area authorities basically stopped conducting actual interventions in August 1995, with the 
mentioned exception of September and November 2000, while Japanese authorities intensified 
actual interventions in 2003 and early 2004 (Table 1). 
                                                 
4 The European Central Bank is the exception, as it has acknowledged the dates of its interventions in 
September and November 2000, but has not made public the amounts of intervention. In these four cases, 
the data on the intervention amounts used are those reported by financial market participants, or more 
precisely as reported by Reuters News. 
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Turning to exchange rate communication, the first issue is how to measure such communication. 
In principle, one would like to obtain a complete list of all statements in which policy-makers 
express a view about the domestic exchange rate. Since the objective of the paper is to measure 
whether such communication is successful in moving foreign exchange markets in the intended 
way, one should look in particular at all those statements that become available to market 
participants. The newswire service Reuters News was therefore chosen as the source from which 
to extract all headline statements that occurred by relevant policy-makers since 1990 because such 
a newswire service provider is the most likely source of information for market participants. A 
further challenge is that one statement may be followed by several newswire reports. The 
extraction of the newswire reports was therefore done so as to include only the first of these 
reports. In most cases, such reports are posted within minutes of a policy-maker’s statement. This 
allows conducting the empirical analysis using a daily frequency, with all exchange rate quotes 
used throughout the paper at 18.00 US Eastern Standard Time (EST). 
A second issue who the relevant policy-makers are that should be included in the analysis. In the 
United States and in Japan, exchange rate policy is in the realm of the Treasury and the Ministry 
of Finance, respectively. However, officials at the Federal Reserve and the bank of Japan also 
occasionally make statements about the exchange rate, so that the list of policy-makers includes 
the Treasury Secretary, his deputy and the members of the FOMC for the United States; and the 
Minister of Finance and his deputy plus the Governor and two Vice Governors of the Bank of 
Japan for the analysis of Japan. For the United States, the great majority of statements extracted 
indeed comes from the Treasury officials, while relatively few come from the Federal Reserve. 
For instance, only seven statements were extracted for Chairman Greenspan for the entire 1990-
2003 period. 
By contrast, exchange rate policy in Europe has traditionally been the responsibility of the 
respective central banks with finance ministry officials usually providing relatively few statements 
on the exchange rate overall. Moreover, exchange rate communication is de facto mostly 
conducted by members of the ECB Governing Council (ECB Monthly Bulletin 2001, page 59). 
For the period since monetary union in the euro area in 1999, the 18 members of the Governing 
Council are included in the analysis, whereas the members of the Bundesbank Zentralbankrat are 
the ones included for the period 1990-1998. 
Given this list of policy-makers two sets of search criteria were used to extract all statements that 
fulfil these criteria. The search word is the word “exchange rate” or the name of the exchange rate 
– e.g. US dollar for the United States. The second word is the title or the name of the relevant 
policy-maker. This is followed by the third and most difficult step, which is to classify the content 
of the statements. The analysis of the content of language is often referred to as content analysis 
(e.g. Holsti 1969, Kassarjian 1977). The objective is to provide a systematic classification of the 
meaning of statements. For the purpose of this paper, one would like to know whether a statement 
11
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is supporting a stronger domestic currency, a weaker one, or whether the policy-maker is neutral, 










statement oral weakening if
statement oral ambiguous if







Table 2 provides some summary information for the period 1990-2003. One important part of 
such content analysis is to provide clear rules by which to classify the statements. In most cases it 
has been straightforward to classify, but in some cases it was unclear. The way we chose to 
approach this issue is that two people looked over the statements, and those that wee not 
unanimous were discarded from the analysis. The more difficult statements to classify were often 
those by US policy-makers that attempted to weaken the US dollar, and those by euro area policy-
makers that intended to weaken the euro or Deutsche mark. As explained by Robert Rubin (Rubin 
and Weisberg 2003), policy-makers often tend to use very subtle and slight changes in their 
language to indicate a shift in policy. However, the advantage in the case of the newswire service 
is that a lot of the interpretation of the statements is provided by professionals who are aware of 
these nuances and most experienced in interpreting such changes. 
Nevertheless, these points also provide some of the caveats for using such an analysis for 
extracting a communication database. A first caveat is that newswire reports may not reflect the 
true intention of the policy-maker. Moreover, a further potential drawback is that not all 
statements may be reported and thus that the list of statements extracted is not a complete list of 
all statements made. However, the objective of the present paper is to analyse the market reaction 
to communication; hence it seems sensible to focus only on those statement that actually become 
available to market participants, and again Reuters News is among those providers who receive 
the greatest attention among traders and investors. 
Finally, comparing communication and actual interventions shows some marked differences 
across authorities over the past 15 years. In particular, the almost complete cessation of actual 
interventions by US and euro area authorities since 1995 is contrasted by the frequent use of 
actual interventions by Japanese authorities, which in particular have increased in magnitude over 
the years. 
 
3  Time-Series Approach: Methodology and Evidence 
I first turn to the time-series evidence for analysing the long-term effectiveness of oral and actual 
interventions. Do communication and actual interventions move exchange rates? And if so, does 
this imply that the oral and actual interventions have a long-run effect? This section addresses this 
12
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issue by analysing the contemporaneous and dynamic effects of interventions in an EGARCH 
framework, first for the spot exchange rate, and then by using forward-looking exchange rates 
based on OTC option contracts and other asset prices. 
 
3.1  Empirical methodology and hypotheses 
As the starting point, the evolution of the exchange rate (st) is modelled as a function of 
fundamentals, or more precisely as a function of agents’ expectations of future fundamentals ft+i: 
 






t f E s Ω − = ∑
∞
=
+ θ θ       ( 1 )  
 
where θ is the discount factor and Ωt the information set at time t. Oral interventions (IOt), as 
classified and explained in section 2, and actual intervention (IAt), measured as the intervention 
amounts in US dollars, are part of the information set Ωt, but also other relevant fundamentals Xt 
are part of this set. In the empirical framework, the change in the log spot exchange rate (∆st) is 
therefore modelled as a function of the difference in interest rates between the two countries (i*-i), 
both types of interventions, fundamentals and day-of-the-week effects (Wt): 
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which constitutes the estimation equation for the conditional mean of the US dollar – euro 
exchange rate, and an analogous model applies to the yen – US dollar exchange rate. For daily 
data, the change in the log exchange rate exhibits strong non-normality, in particular significant 
heteroskedasticity with εt ~ (0,ht), excess kurtosis and skewness. A commonly employed way to 
correct for this is to model the conditional second moment explicitly using some form of a 
GARCH (1,1) model. Here I use an EGARCH(1,1) specification of Nelson (1991) which has the 
advantage that no non-negativity constraints on the coefficients of the conditional second 
moments need to be imposed: 
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The model is estimated using a standard log likelihood function. Finally, it is worth noting that 
part of the literature has focused on the effects of interventions on FX market volatility using 
related GARCH or other frameworks.
5 The results shown below, however, are largely robust to 
using alternative specifications of the model. 
 
3.2  Evidence from spot exchange rates 
I now turn to the empirical results of the model based on spot exchange rates for daily data over 
the period 1990-2003. The parameters β and γ in the conditional mean equation (2) measure the 
contemporaneous effect of oral and actual interventions by the respective authorities. Table 3 
presents the results for these contemporaneous effects when controlling for the macroeconomic 
news Xt., day-of-the-week effects Wt and the interest rate differential.
6 
The key result is that both oral interventions and actual interventions by the three authorities have 
a highly significant contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate on the day they occur. On 
average, an oral intervention moves the daily exchange rate by between 0.14% and 0.22%. By 
contrast, the impact of actual interventions varies substantially. An actual intervention by German 
authorities of USD 1 billion moved the exchange rate by about 1.1%, whereas US actual 
interventions only had a significant effect on the yen – US dollar exchange rate. The smallest 
effect of actual interventions are those by the Bank of Japan where a USD 1 billion purchase or 
sale moved the exchange rate by a mere 0.087%. This is very similar to the contemporaneous 
effect found by Ito (2002). 
 
 
However, it should be stressed again at this point that US and euro area authorities basically 
stopped actual interventions in August 1995, whereas Japanese authorities continued and even 
intensified actual interventions in 2003 and early 2004, purchasing around USD 180 billion in 
2003 and about USD 140 billion in the first quarter of 2004. Hence the smaller effect of Japanese 
interventions may merely reflect the fact that the rapid rise in financial integration and in trading 
volumes in FX markets require larger actual interventions to move the exchange rate by the 
desired magnitude. As an order of magnitude, the purchase of USD 180 billion by Japanese 
                                                 
5 See for instance Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Baillie and Osterberg (1997), Dominguez (2003) and 
Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003). Moreover, Beine, Bénassy-Quéré and Lecourt (2002) argue that 
a fractionally integrated GARCH (FIGARCH) model could be a more appropriate model to formulate the 
conditional variance. However, using a standard FIGARCH specification did not yield qualitatively 
different results from the EGARCH(1,1) model employed here. 
6 The results for these control variables are not shown in Table 3 for reasons of brevity. A detailed 
discussion of macroeconomic news and calendar effects for exchange rates can be found e.g. in Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003). 
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authorities in 2003, and given a point estimate of 0.087, implies that Japanese interventions helped 
to weaken the yen by more than 15% on a cumulative basis. 
A potentially important caveat to all estimations about the effect of interventions in the literature 
is that interventions may inherently be endogenous, i.e. they may not only alter current and future 
exchange rate movements, but they may react to past exchange rate movements or trends. Kearns 
and Rigobon (2004) suggest a methodology for correcting for such an endogeneity bias by 
modelling directly the potential behaviour and reaction of central banks on the days when they 
conduct interventions. However, it is not clear to what extent and over what horizons policy-
makers react to past exchange rate developments. 
More importantly, if endogeneity was a significant issue for the estimation of the impact of oral 
and actual interventions, it most likely induces a downward bias of the empirical estimates. The 
reason is that there is a broad consensus in the literature (see e.g. Sarno and Taylor 2001) that in 
particular actual interventions tend to be of the leaning-against-the-wind type. This implies that if 
endogeneity really constituted a bias, it would be a downward bias, and the true effect of 
communication and actual interventions may even be somewhat larger. The same argument 
applies to cases when oral or actual interventions are anticipated and hence the impact of the 
interventions may at least in part occur before the intervention event takes place. 
Given the contemporaneous effect shown in Table 3, the central question is how permanent and 
long lasting this effect is. One way of analysing the permanence of the effect is to formulate the 
mean equation in a dynamic context so as to test whether oral and actual interventions have a 
lagged effect on future exchange rate movements: 
 
()
() EA US j IO IA
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χ η δ α
        (4) 
 
which is identical to the model of equation (2), only that now it is tested whether interventions 
have a significant effect on the exchange rate up to an order of T=40 days. I then estimate the 
cumulated impulse responses, i.e. whether there are dynamic, lagged effects of interventions on 
the exchange rate:  
 




k H 0 , 0 : 0 γ β  
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the responses of the US dollar – euro and the yen – US dollar exchange rates 
to different types of interventions, starting from their contemporaneous response and up to 40 
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lags, and their 90% confidence bands. Two key results stand out from the cumulated impulse 
responses. First, for several interventions the point estimate of the effect remains relatively stable 
and changes little over time. In other words, the largest effect of interventions on exchange rates is 
the contemporaneous one, while exchange rates seem to be unaffected by interventions thereafter. 
This suggests that markets are indeed efficient in incorporating the information from interventions 
into prices on the day interventions occur. Moreover, the effects of interventions on exchange 
rates appear economically meaningful, as discussed above for Table 3. 
 
 
The second key result is that statistically the effect of interventions becomes insignificant after a 
few days, usually after two to three days, in those cases where the contemporaneous effect is 
significant. This does not seem surprising as many different pieces of news affect exchange rates 
every day, so that interventions clearly cannot be said to be dominant but are only one source of 
important factors driving exchange rates. 
An alternative way of testing the duration of the effects of oral and actual interventions on 
exchange rates is to use different time windows for the model (2)-(3), i.e. to use 2-day returns, 3-
day returns etc. for the change in the log spot exchange rate (∆st). The results, however, are 
qualitatively very similar to those using cumulated impulse responses, and are not shown here for 
reasons of brevity. 
To allow for a comparison with other factors driving exchange rates, Figure 4 shows the 
cumulated impulse responses for two of the most important macroeconomic news, the US non-
farm payroll employment releases and the Ifo business confidence indicator for the euro area.
7 The 
same pattern as for the intervention variables is also present for these macroeconomic news, i.e. 
while they have a statistically significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates, the 
significance disappears beyond a few days after their release. 
In summary, the evidence based on time-series analysis suggests the presence of a significant 
contemporaneous effect of both oral interventions and actual interventions on exchange rates. 
However, statistically this effect becomes insignificant after a few days. This does not necessarily 
imply that interventions do not have a permanent, long-run effect, but merely that other pieces of 




                                                 
7 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) test for the impact of 
a broad set of US and European macroeconomic news on exchange rates, also showing that these two are 
particularly important news, among others. 
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 528
September 2005 
3.3  Evidence from forward rates and OTC option contracts 
Clearly, the problem of obtaining the true permanent or long-run effect of oral and actual 
interventions of equation (2) is that other pieces of news that occur in the days after an 
intervention introduce “noise” that render the point estimates statistically insignificant after a few 
days. An alternative way of approaching the question of the long-run effectiveness of 
interventions is to look at purely forward-looking asset prices. This section analyses the effect of 
oral and actual interventions on over-the-counter (OTC) option contracts, where these contracts 
range from 1 day to 1 year in their horizon. Thus the effect of communication and of actual 
interventions on such contracts over various horizons provides an indirect measure of their long-
term effectiveness. 
In more detail, the option contracts for the US dollar – euro and the yen – US dollar options come 
from Citigroup, who is one of the largest players in these OTC markets. Moreover, OTC currency 
markets are substantially larger, with a substantially higher trading volume than that of exchange 
traded option contracts. An additional advantage of the OTC contracts comes from the fact that 
their daily quotes are based on fixed moneyness, i.e. the distance between the strike price of the 
option and the corresponding forward rate. By contrast, quotes from exchange traded options are 
usually based on the distance between fixed strike prices and time-varying forward contracts so 
that the time horizon of the quotes varies. 
Finally, this section looks at different types of OTC contracts. In addition to forward rates, the 
OTC contracts analysed are implied volatilities, risk reversals and strangles. In contrast to the 
backward-looking volatility measure obtained from conditional variance equation (3) of the 
EGARCH model, the implied volatility is a purely forward-looking measure that reflects the 
degree of uncertainty among market participants about the exchange rate outlook. Risk reversals 
and strangles are contracts that combine different types of options. A risk reversal is a 
simultaneous sale of an out-of-the-money put option and purchase of an out-of-the-money call 
option. It provides a positioning indicator about market expectations about the future direction of 
the exchange rate. As an example, a positive price of a US dollar – euro risk reversal contract 
indicates that markets are long in euro and thus put a larger probability on a euro appreciation. By 
contrast, a strangle is a contract that combines the simultaneous purchase of an out-of-the-money 
call option and an out-of-the-money put option. It provides a proxy for expectations about large 
future exchange rate movements.
8 
In short, these option contracts provide different and mutually complementary information about 
how communication and actual interventions may affect expectations of exchange rate movements 
                                                 
8 Galati and Melick (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the OTC market and also offer an empirical 
analysis of the effect of actual interventions on exchange rates. Castrén (2004) uses OTC options data to 
analyse the effect of Japanese actual interventions on the different moments of the derived risk neutral 
densities of the contracts. 
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and underlying risks over the medium- to long-run. As a starting point, Figures 5 and 6 show the 
response of forward contracts with horizons ranging from 1 day to 1 year to oral interventions and 
actual interventions in the US dollar – euro market (Figure 5) and the yen – US dollar market 
(Figure 6). In all cases do the forward rates of contracts with shorter maturities react more 
strongly to oral and actual interventions than those with longer maturities. A key finding of the 
analysis is that forward rates of up to and including 6 months react statistically significantly to 
communication for US and euro area authorities. By contrast, actual interventions affect forward 
rates only at most 1 month for the yen – US dollar exchange rate, and even only 1 week for the US 
dollar – euro exchange rate. 
 
 
Overall, a first key finding therefore is that communication affects forward rates over a longer 
horizon than actual interventions. The finding thus may be interpreted as evidence in favour of the 
long-term, or at least medium-term effectiveness of exchange rate communication. However, as a 
caveat it should be stressed that actual interventions tend to lean against the exchange rate trend 
relatively more often than exchange rate communication. Hence at least part of this difference 
may be explained by these differences in environment under which oral and actual interventions 
take place. 
The next step of the analysis focuses on the different option contracts – implied volatility, risk 
reversal and strangle – as outlined above. Table 4 shows the results for both types of interventions 
and for both the US dollar – euro and the yen – US dollar exchange rates. The central finding is 
that communication tends to reduce implied volatility in most cases whereas actual interventions 
raise  implied volatility. This implies that communication tends to lower market uncertainty, 
whereas actual interventions increase it. This finding is consistent with the finding of Table 3 on 
historical volatility from the EGARCH model. It underlines a fundamental difference between 
communication versus actual interventions. 
 
 
One possible explanation for this finding may arise from the very different ways official 
statements about the exchange rate and actual interventions are made. On the one hand, 
communication is available to all market participants in the same way and the great majority of 
market participants may interpret a statement in the same way. Hence exchange rate 
communication that is considered to offer relevant information tends to reduce the heterogeneity 
of beliefs among market participants and thus lowers market volatility. On the other hand, actual 
interventions are mostly conducted in secret without policy-makers announcing that such 
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interventions have taken place. Although many market participants may have an indication that an 
actual intervention by a central bank has occurred, views about the scale, frequency and likelihood 
of future interventions may differ widely across market participants. Hence one may indeed 
expect such actual interventions to raise the degree of market uncertainty. 
 
 
Finally, Table 5 shows the response of other asset prices – equity returns, short-term and long-
term interest rates – to communication and actual interventions. While there is some modest 
reaction of equity markets to US oral and actual interventions, neither short-term nor long-term 
interest rates respond significantly to either communication or actual interventions. One 
interpretation of this finding is that market participants do not see either communication or actual 
intervention to provide a signal for future monetary policy decisions so that interest rates remain 
broadly unchanged. 
 
4.  Event-Study Approach: Methodology 
As to the alternative methodology, I now turn to the event-study approach. The rationale for 
taking an event-study approach to the analysis of interventions is the fact that both communication 
and actual interventions tend to occur in clusters, i.e. in certain periods several interventions take 
place within a few days while there are no interventions over other, extended periods of time (e.g. 
MacKinlay 1997). The reasons for why monetary authorities conduct interventions in such 
clusters may be manifold, but one of the possible reasons is that authorities may decide to 
continue conducting interventions until they have achieved a certain objective or they have 
realised that the efforts are in vain. Whatever the precise reason for the duration and magnitude of 
the interventions, the key premise of the event-study approach is to treat each cluster of 
interventions as a separate event and to test their effectiveness. 
Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Humpage (1999) use similar approaches to analyse interventions 
in the DEM-USD market in the period 1985-1995 and in 1987-1990, respectively. Based on 
various criteria to measure the effectiveness or “success” of actual interventions but using 
different empirical methodologies to test for effectiveness, the two studies find quite different 
results. The study by Fatum and Hutchison shows that intervention events helped move the 
exchange rate in the desired direction in the great majority of the cases. For instance, even 15 days 
after the end of intervention events the DEM-USD exchange rate had moved in the intended 
direction in as many as two thirds of the cases. The results for the shorter time sample by 
Humpage, however, finds much less evidence in favour of effectiveness of interventions, though 
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4.1  Defining an event 
A first important issue is to define the length of the event window, i.e. the maximum number of 
days that can lie between two interventions so that these two are still to be considered as part of 
the same event. On the one hand, the longer this time window is chosen, the more interventions 
will be clustered and defined to be part of the same event, but for a given number of interventions 
taking a longer window also reduces the overall number of events that can be analysed. The 
danger of taking a very long window is that it may put together interventions that belong to 
different intervention episodes or may even have pursued different objectives.  
On the other hand, the shorter the time window the more events are obtained, but at the danger of 
separating interventions into different events that were part of the same effort by monetary 
authorities. Moreover, a further disadvantage of choosing a shorter time window is that it does not 
allow an analysis for a long pre-event period and post-event period in isolation from other events. 
The chosen time window is 10 days, which implies that an intervention or a set of interventions is 
defined as an event if there is no other intervention in the 10 days before the first and no other 
intervention during the 10 days after the last intervention of the event. Other event windows were 
also tested in order to check for the robustness of the results. Using a window definition based on 
as few as 5 days and as many as one month shows very similar results to the ones presented 
below. 
Tables 6-9 show summary statistics for the events obtained from this event definition. For Table 
6, 86 events of oral interventions by US and euro area authorities in the US dollar – euro market 
are identified for the period 1990-2003. They are fairly evenly spaced over these 14 years, 
although there are periods when oral interventions are much more intense than in other periods. 
The “event type” in the table indicates whether the majority of the oral interventions in the 
respective event intended to strengthen the US dollar (+1) or weaken the US dollar vis-à-vis the 
euro (-1). The final three columns in the table show the exchange rate movement during the 5 days 
before the respective event, during the event, and during the 5 days after the event. Table 7 
presents the list of 95 events and summary statistics for Japanese and US oral interventions in the 
yen – US dollar market. 
 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show the event definitions and summary statistics for actual interventions in the 
two FX markets. For US and euro area interventions, there are merely 22 events since 1990. Table 
8 clearly shows that actual interventions by US and euro area authorities basically stopped in 
August 1995. After this date, actual interventions in the US dollar – euro market occurred only on 
22 September 2000 with a coordinated intervention of the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
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of Japan, and a unilateral intervention by the ECB in early November 2000. Moreover, with the 
exception of a substantial number of interventions in late 1990 and early 1991, most intervention 
events comprised one or two isolated intervention days. 
By contrast, Table 9 shows that with 45 actual intervention episodes there have been far more 
interventions in the yen – US dollar market since 1990. 1992-93 and 2003 were periods with 
particularly heavy actual intervention activity in this market. The table also reveals the distinct 
changes in the direction of intervention: interventions in 1990-92 and in late 1997-early 1998 were 
exclusively those in which selling US dollar intended to strengthen the yen. In all other periods 
interventions aimed at weakening the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar, and in almost all intervention 
events after 1995 interventions were undertaken unilaterally by the Japanese authorities. 
Finally, comparing the events of oral interventions with the corresponding events for actual 
interventions reveals a high degree of consistency between these two types of events. In other 
words, most periods were characterised by oral interventions that were in line with those 
conducted through actual interventions. However, in some periods the two may deviate, which 
when checking in more detail proved to be periods when the objectives and interventions of the 
respective two monetary authorities were not always in line with one another. Nevertheless, 
overall both have been consistent for most of the time since 1990. 
 
4.2  Defining the “success” of an event  
The central question is: what constitutes a “successful” event? The definition adopted here is that 
a “successful” intervention event is one in which the intervention moves the exchange rate in the 
desired direction on the day of the intervention and possibly also in subsequent days. However, a 
number of important caveats should be stressed. First, in principle a successful event should be 
one that achieves the objective of the policy-maker that undertakes it. However, objectives may be 
manifold and cannot be observed directly. For instance, it has been conjectured that the objective 
of several episodes of intervention after the Louvre Accord in 1987 was not necessarily to weaken 
the US dollar further, but merely to stabilise and to reduce uncertainty and volatility in the 
markets (e.g. Edison 1993). Nevertheless, it may be fair to assume that many intervention 
episodes since 1990 had an objective also in terms of the level of the exchange rate and thus the 
adopted definition of “success” here seems to be the most appropriate one. 
A second caveat is that assessing whether an intervention episode succeeded in moving the 
exchange rate in the desired direction requires knowing what the counterfactual is, i.e. what 
would have happened to the exchange rate if no interventions had taken place. On the one hand, 
the efficient market hypothesis implies that expected exchange rate movements, in particular for 
daily frequency, follow a random walk, i.e. the null hypothesis of the expected exchange rate 
change being zero cannot be rejected. On the other hand, exchange rates tend to follow trends, 
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which implies that there is a positive relationship of exchange rate changes in particular at daily 
frequency, although statistically it cannot be rejected that exchange rate changes are white noise. 
 
4.3  Measuring the “success” of an event 
The event-study approach in essence reduces the dimensionality of the exchange rate evolution 
into a discrete variable of whether or not an intervention even moved the exchange rate in the 
desired way. For measuring the “success” of events, this sub-section follows an approach as 
outlined in MacKinlay (1997) for event-study approaches in general, and builds also on the work 
by Humpage (1999) and by Fatum and Hutchison (2003) on actual interventions in the DEM – 
USD market. 
Four alternative and partly complementary criteria are used to evaluate the success of intervention 
events. The precise definitions of the four success criteria are shown in the table below, indicating 
the exchange rates changes ∆s before (“pre”), after (“post”) and during the event (“eve”) and the 
event type or objective of the intervention event (I), with I<0 indicating an attempt to weaken the 
domestic currency and I>0 to strengthen it. 
 
Success criteria of event-study approach 
   
Definition of “success”: 
 
“event” 
criterion:  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 0 , 0 < < ∆ > > ∆ I s or I s
eve eve  
“direction” 
criterion:  ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 0 , 0 < < ∆ > > ∆ I s or I s
post post  
“reversal” 
criterion:  ( ) ( ) 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 > ∆ < < ∆ < ∆ > > ∆
pre post pre post s iff I s or s iff I s  
“smoothing” 
criterion:  ( ) ( ) 0 0 , 0 0 , > ∆ < ∆ < ∆ < ∆ > ∆ > ∆
pre pre post pre pre post s iff I s s or s iff I s s
 
First, the “event” criterion tests whether the direction of the exchange rate change during the event 
is consistent with the interventions themselves, i.e. whether an intervention to e.g. strengthen the 
US dollar indeed leads to such a change during the event. Second, the “direction” criterion tests 
whether the exchange rate movement over the post-event window is in the desired direction. 
As discussed earlier on, many interventions are of the “leaning-against-the-wind” type, i.e. they 
try to reverse or at least to smooth the pre-event exchange rate movements. The third and fourth 
criteria are therefore defined only for these types of interventions. The third criteria is the 
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“reversal” criterion that tests whether the intervention event succeeds in appreciating the currency 
after the event if it was depreciating before, or in depreciating the exchange rate when it was 
appreciating prior to the event. Fourth, the “smoothing” criterion is less demanding in its 
definition of “success” by investigating merely whether intervention events manage to reduce or 
smooth the strength of the pre-event exchange rate movements.  
Under the condition that the exchange rate change is never exactly zero – which holds for all the 
different event-study windows – the sign test is used to test whether the number of “successes” 
(n+) is larger than 50%, or equivalently larger than the number of “failures” (n–), with the null 
hypothesis as n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.5), and with n as the total number of events. A key point to 
stress is that each of the success criteria makes an implicit assumption about the underlying 
counter-factual. The first three criteria take a change of zero as counter-factual, and indeed the 
unconditional probability in the data, when excluding periods of interventions, of observing a 
positive change in the exchange rate is 50.4% and the mean daily exchange rate change at 
0.0030%. However, the issue is different for the “smoothing” criterion as the unconditional 
probability of observing a change in the daily exchange rate that is consistent with this criterion is 
75%. Hence the null for the “smoothing” criterion is n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.75). 
 
5.  Event-Study Approach: Empirical Results 
I now turn to the empirical results for communication and for actual interventions for the different 
success criteria. The first part of this section presents the benchmark results, while section 5.2 
discusses robustness tests and extensions. The final sub-section then analyses the determinants of 
the success of interventions events. 
 
5.1  Benchmark results 
The first set of columns of Table 10 presents the results for the different success criteria for the 
combined US and euro oral interventions and actual interventions in the US dollar – euro market 
while the second set of columns shows the corresponding results for the yen – US dollar market. 
The first columns indicate the percentage of successes in all events for each of the success criteria, 
the second column the corresponding p-values, and the third column the mean difference in the 
exchange rate change under the different criteria. The pre- and post-event windows in the 
benchmark specification are chosen to be five days, although section 5.2 also shows the sensitivity 
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Overall, there is overwhelming evidence that both oral intervention events as well as actual 
intervention events have been successful. Turning first to oral interventions in the US dollar – 
euro market, 75% of the events succeeded in moving the exchange rate in the desired direction 
during the event (“event” criterion) and still almost two thirds of the events managed in doing so 
after the event (“direction” criterion). Both of these success criteria are statistically significantly 
higher than p=50% at the 99% significance level. The success rate of the “reversal” criterion is 
somewhat lower at around 63%, although it is still statistically significantly at the 95% level. The 
highest rate of “success” is obtained by the “smoothing” criterion where 88% of the events 
managed to at least reduce the exchange rate movement in the five-day pre-event period. Finally, 
the results for oral interventions in the yen – US dollar market are very similar, with the only 
exception that the success rate based on the “event” criterion fares worse. 
The success of actual interventions is mostly comparable to that of oral interventions although 
there are also some remarkable differences. Most strikingly, and maybe surprisingly, the success 
rate of actual interventions during intervention events is less than 50%, i.e. they more often fail to 
move the exchange rate in the desired direction during the event as compared to after the event. 
There are several possible explanations for this. One may be related to the fact that actual 
interventions are usually conducted in secret and hence may take some days to be fully priced into 
the market. Moreover, this finding may provide support for the argument that interventions should 
be analysed as events and not individually in isolation, i.e. intervention events may stop only 
when policy-makers have achieved their objective, thus explaining why the post-event success 
rate is substantially higher than the event success rate for both the US dollar – euro and the yen – 
US dollar markets. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that both oral interventions and actual interventions by G3 
authorities have been very effective in achieving their desired objectives. Oral interventions 
appear to be more successful during the events, while actual interventions have a somewhat higher 
success rate than oral interventions when they are of the “leaning-against-the-wind” type and 
attempt to reverse the previous exchange rate trend. 
 
5.2  Extensions and robustness tests 
As the next step, various extensions and robustness checks are conducted. A first important issue 
is how robust the results are to changing the length of the pre- and post-event time window. Figure 
7 shows the evolution of the direction, reversal and smoothing criteria for pre- and post-event 
windows ranging from 1 to 40 days and for the oral interventions in the US dollar – euro market. 
The solid lines indicate the success rate of the different criteria and the dotted lines the 
corresponding p-values. Figure 8 presents the same analysis for actual interventions in the yen – 
US dollar market. 
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The key finding of this analysis is that the success rate remains relatively stable and falls only 
moderately when extending the time window. The p-values reveal that intervention events are 
statistically successful at the 90% level for all time windows from 1 to 40 days, while only the 
reversal criterion of the oral interventions in Figure 7 becomes insignificantly different from 50% 
between 15 and 30 days. Similar results apply to Figure 8 for US and Japanese actual 
interventions, although such actual interventions are statistically effective in inducing a reversal of 
the exchange rate only up to around 30 days. 
 
 
It should be stressed that a potential problem with such an analysis of up to 40 days after each 
event is that it may overlap with future intervention events as the definition of the event window 
requires only that there are no interventions of 10 days or more to separate two events. However, 
as Tables 6-9 show, most events using this definition nevertheless have at least one month of no 
interventions in between so that this problem is minor. Moreover, using different even-window 
definitions of up to 40 days yields a smaller number of events but essentially very similar results 
to the ones presented in Tables 10-14 and Figures 7-8. 
Second, are there differences in the type of interventions, i.e. are interventions that go against the 
prevalent policy mantra, more effective than those that merely re-state the usual policy position? 
As discussed in section 2, US and euro area authorities have traditionally pursued a policy 
supporting a strong domestic currency although there have been periods when this was not the 
case. Table 11 shows that oral interventions are indeed substantially more effective if they aim at 
weakening the domestic currency as compared to when they try to strengthen it. In some cases this 
difference is substantial. For example, oral interventions aiming at a stronger domestic currency 
have only a slightly higher success ratio than 50% in reversing the exchange rate trend, whereas 
oral interventions against the mantra by US and euro area authorities have success ratios of 
reversal of 70.4% and 77.8%, respectively. 
 
 
Third, the signalling hypothesis entails the conjecture that oral interventions may be used by 
authorities to signal future monetary policy changes or actual interventions. This argument is 
analogous to the one for actual interventions made in the literature (Mussa 1981, Lewis 1995, 
Kaminsky and Lewis 1996, Bonser-Neal, Roley and Sellon 1998). The signalling hypothesis 
therefore implies that oral interventions alone may have little effect on the exchange rate, but they 
are effective mainly because they signal and help markets anticipate future monetary policy 
changes or actual interventions.  
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Two tests are conducted to investigate the role of the signalling channel. First it is tested whether 
oral interventions are more effective when they coincide with or precede by 10 days or less any 
actual intervention events. Comparing Table 10 for all oral intervention events with Table 12 only 
for those that are accompanied with actual interventions reveals that the latter events are generally 
not more successful by US and euro area authorities for the US dollar – euro market. By contrast, 
oral intervention events by Japanese and US authorities in the yen – US dollar market are in some 
cases substantially more successful when they are accompanied by actual interventions. 
This different evidence seems convincing for a number of reasons. Most importantly, it should be 
recalled that US and euro area authorities have basically stopped conducting actual interventions 
in 1995 whereas the majority of oral interventions occurred thereafter. Hence it seems convincing 
that oral interventions by the two authorities are unlikely to have functioned via signalling actual 
interventions. By contrast, Japanese authorities continued to intervene, intensifying actual 
interventions in 2003 and early 2004, so that it seems credible that oral interventions by Japanese 
policy makers may have been effective at least in part by having been understood to signal or at 
least raise the probability of actual interventions. 
Finally, Table 13 shows the results when analysing only those interventions that have not been 
supported or been followed by monetary policy changes. Comparing the success ratios of these 
intervention events with the overall group shown in Table 10 reveals that overall oral intervention 
episodes are generally not less effective when they are not supported or followed by monetary 
policy changes. In most cases, the success ratios are little changed from those for all oral 
interventions presented in Table 10. 
In summary, this sub-section has shown that the effectiveness of both oral and actual interventions 
is quite robust to altering the length of the pre- and post-event windows. In fact, the event-study 
methodology suggests that both types of interventions are still fairly successful even 40 days after 
the end of intervention events. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the effectiveness of 
communication on exchange rates is not related to the signalling channel, at least for US and euro 
area authorities, and that it is an effective policy tool in is own right. Moreover, oral interventions 
that deviate from the prevalent policy mantra are in many cases substantially more effective than 
those that merely re-affirm it. 
 
5.3  Determinants of success 
What explains why some intervention events are successful while others are not? The final part of 
the analysis is to test which factors explain the success of intervention events. As discussed above, 
one hypothesis is that intervention events are more successful if they signal future monetary 
policy changes. Alternatively, for instance Humpage (1999) found that interventions tend to be 
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more successful if they are coordinated internationally. Moreover, a further hypothesis is that oral 
and actual interventions tend to be more successful if they occur in periods of large uncertainty. 
To test these hypotheses, I take a logit model with a logistic density function that expresses the 
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such that the odds ratio is larger than one if events are more likely to be successful if X=1 as 
compared to X=0. In the analysis, I express all explanatory variables as discrete variables, such 
that X=1 e.g. if interventions are coordinated and X=0 if they are not coordinated. In this case the 
odds ratio simplifies to e
β. Measuring X as a continuous variable, where possible, yields 
qualitatively very similar results to the ones presented below. 
Table 14 shows the results for various explanatory factors related to exchange rates, monetary 
policy and coordination for all combined interventions in the US dollar – euro and the yen – US 
dollar markets. For oral interventions, the estimates of the odds ratios indicate that oral 
intervention events are more successful if they are leaning with the trend, i.e. go in the same 
direction as the exchange rate trend during the pre-event period. The odds ratio for oral 
interventions is, however, statistically significant at the 95% level only for the event criterion. The 
odds ratio of 1.99 implies that an oral intervention event is twice as likely to be successful if it 
goes in the same direction as the pre-event exchange rate trend. 
Oral intervention events are also more likely to be successful if exchange rates were volatile 
before the event (model 2) and if they were strongly misaligned, i.e. if deviation from PPP are 
above average (model 3). Here the odds ratios are statistically significant for the event and the 
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direction criteria and lie between 2.4 and 3.2. Moreover, oral intervention events are more likely 
to be successful if they are coordinated, i.e. if they occur in clusters (model 6), if they are 
supported through actual interventions during the event (model 7) and if they coincide with 
supportive oral interventions by foreign monetary authorities (model 8). The success criteria for 
which this is the case are again the event and the direction criteria. 
By contrast, oral intervention events do not seem to be more successful if they are supportive of 
the existing monetary policy trend or supported by monetary policy decisions during or after the 
events (models 4 and 5) as the odds ratios are mostly close to one and none of them is statistically 
significant. This result is fully consistent and supports the finding of the previous sub-section and 
suggests that the success of communication does not seem to be related to the signalling channel 
of communication with regards to monetary policy. 
Turning to actual interventions, the results are in some regards similar and other very different to 
those for exchange rate communication. The results are similar in that actual intervention events 
tend to be more successful if they are leaning with the pre-event exchange rate trend and occur in 
periods of large exchange rate volatility and uncertainty. They are also more likely to be 
successful if they are coordinated domestically and internationally. 
A key difference, however, is that actual intervention events tend to be more successful if they 
coincide with or are followed by monetary policy changes that are consistent with the intervention 
event (model 5). In those cases, actual interventions are more than four times as likely to be 
successful for the direction and reversal success criteria. 
In summary, the evidence presented suggests that communication and actual intervention events 
tend to be more successful when they go in the same direction as the pre-event exchange rate 
trend, if they occur in periods of large volatility and uncertainty and when exchange rates are 
misaligned. They are also more successful if they are coordinated domestically and with 
communication or actual interventions of foreign authorities. However, there is no evidence that 
the success of communication is related to monetary policy. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Many monetary authorities have moved away from conducting actual interventions and have used 
communication as their primary policy instrument to influence exchange rates when deemed 
necessary and desirable. While the literature provides evidence that both oral interventions and 
actual interventions have a contemporaneous effect on exchange rates, the open question that 
remains is how permanent these effects are and whether monetary authorities can succeed in 
altering the path of the exchange rate over the medium-term. 
The objective of this paper has been to address this question by comparing two alternative 
empirical methodologies. The evidence based on a standard time-series approach, using 
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cumulated impulse responses from a GARCH-type of model with daily exchange rate and 
intervention data, suggests that there is a strong contemporaneous effect, but that statistically this 
effect cannot be shown to persist for more than a few days. The paper has argued that the lack of 
statistical evidence may not prove that interventions have no medium- to long-term effect, but 
simply that the large number of news that affect foreign exchange markets every day does not 
allow measuring the medium- to long-term effect of interventions. In fact, evidence based on 
forward-looking, over-the-counter option contracts suggests that both oral and actual interventions 
are indeed affecting exchange rates over the medium-run. 
The paper has then presented an alternative methodology, an event-study approach, to analyse the 
long-term effectiveness of interventions. The key premise of the event-study approach is that both 
oral interventions and actual interventions occur in clusters, i.e. several interventions often occur 
in a short time span while no interventions are made in other periods, and thus that empirically 
interventions should be analysed as events and not in isolation from one another. Based on four 
criteria and non-parametric sign tests for the “success” of interventions, the empirical findings 
provide strong evidence for the long-term effectiveness of both oral interventions and actual 
interventions by US, Japanese and euro area authorities since 1990. 
The results also reveal that exchange rate communication is effective in influencing exchange 
rates mostly independently of actual interventions and of monetary policy. Perhaps with the 
exception of oral interventions by Japanese authorities, the evidence suggests that communication 
may exert a lasting influence on exchange rates not by signalling future monetary policy or actual 
interventions, what is generally referred to as the signalling channel, but rather at least in part by 
providing relevant information to market participants and possibly by coordinating private sector 
beliefs and actions, as consistent with the functioning of a coordination channel of interventions. 
This finding is consistent with recent work on microstructure models that emphasises the 
importance of dynamic effects of news and fundamentals on exchange rates. 
The literature on analysing and understanding the importance of communication for asset prices, 
and in particular for exchange rates, is still in its infancy. However, from a policy perspective it is 
important to understand the role communication may play as a policy tool and what its limitations 
are. The objective of the paper has been to contribute towards a better understanding of this role of 
communication, though many open issues, in particular concerning the channels through which 
communication works, remain for future work. 
29
ECB




Andersen, Torben G., Tim Bollerslev, Francis X. Diebold and Clara Vega. 2003. Micro Effects of 
Macro Announcements: Real-Time Price Discovery in Foreign Exchange. American 
Economic Review 39(1): 38-62. 
Baillie, Richard T. and William P. Osterberg. 1997. Central Bank Intervention and Risk in the 
Forward Market, Journal of International Economics 43:3–4, 483–97. 
Beine, Michel, Bénassy-Quéré, Agnes and Christelle Lecourt. 2002. Central Bank Intervention 
and Foreign Exchange Rates: New Evidence from FIGARCH Estimations. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 21, 115-144. 
Bonser-Neal, Catherine, V. Vance Roley and Gordon H. Sellon. 1998. Monetary Policy Actions, 
Intervention, and Exchange Rates: A Reexamination of the Empirical Relationships Using 
Federal Funds Rate Target Data, Journal of Business 71:2, 147–77. 
Bonser-Neal, Catherine and Glenn Tanner. 1996. Central Bank Intervention and the Volatility of 
Foreign Exchange Rates: Evidence from the Options Market, Journal of International Money 
and Finance 15:6, 853–78. 
Castrén, Olli. 2004. Do options-implied RND functions on G3 currencies move around the times 
of interventions on the JPY/USD exchange rate? ECB Working Paper No. 410. 
Dominguez, Kathryn M. 2003. The Market Microstructure of Central Bank Intervention. Journal 
of International Economics 59, 25-45. 
Dominguez, Kathryn M. and Jeffrey A. Frankel. 1993a. Does Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Work? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
Dominguez, Kathryn M. and Jeffrey A. Frankel. 1993b. Does Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Matter? The Portfolio Effect, American Economic Review 83:5, 1356–69. 
Edison, Hali J. 1993. The Effectiveness of Central-Bank Intervention: A Survey of the Literature 
after 1982, Special Papers in International Economics 18, Princeton University. 
Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher. 2005. Exchange Rates and Fundamentals: New 
Evidence from Real-Time Data, forthcoming in Journal of International Money and Finance, 
March 2005. 
European Central Bank. 2001. Monthly Bulletin, January 2001, 57-75. 
Evans, Martin D. and Richard K. Lyons. 2002. Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics, Journal 
of Political Economy, 170-180. 
Evans, Martin D. and Richard K. Lyons. 2005. Do Currency Markets Absorb News Quickly? 
Journal of International Money and Finance 24:2, 197-219. 
Fatum, Rasmus and Michael M. Hutchison. 2003. Is Sterilised Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Effective After All? An Event Study Approach. Economic Journal 113(April), 390-411. 
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 528
September 2005 
Fratzscher, Marcel. 2004. Communication and Exchange Rate Policy. ECB Working Paper No. 
363, May 2004. 
Frenkel, Michael, Christian Pierdzioch and Georg Stadtmann. 2003. The Effects of Japanese 
Foreign Exchange Market Interventions on the Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate Volatility, 
International Review of Economics and Finance. 
Holsti, O. 1969. Content Analysis for Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Humpage, Owen F. 1999. US Intervention: Assessing the Probability of Success. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 31: 732-47. 
Ito, Takatoshi. 2002. Is Foreign Exchange Intervention Effective? The Japanese Experience in the 
1990s. NBER Working Paper No. 8914, April 2002. 
Jansen, D.-J. and J. de Haan. 2005. Talking Heads: The Effects of ECB Statements on the Euro-
Dollar Exchange Rate. Forthcoming, Journal of International Money and Finance. 
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Karen K. Lewis. 1996. Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Signal 
Future Monetary Policy? Journal of Monetary Economics 37:2, 285–312. 
Kassarjian, Harold H. 1977. “Content Analysis in Consumer Research.” Journal of Consumer 
Research 4: 8–18. 
Kearns, Jonathan and Roberto Rigobon. 2004. Identifying the Efficacy of Central Bank 
Interventions: Evidence from Australia and Japan. Journal of International Economics. 
Lewis, Karen K. 1995. Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related and Does 
It Really Matter? Journal of Business 68:2, 185–214. 
MacKinlay, A.C. 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance, Journal of Economic Literature 
35: 13-39. 
Mussa, Michael. 1981. The Role of Official Intervention. New York: Group of Thirty. 
Nelson, Daniel B. 1991. Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach 
Econometrica 59:2, 347-70. 
Osler, Carol. 2002. Currency Orders and exchange-Rate Dynamics: An Explanation for the 
Predictive Success of Technical Analysis. Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Peiers, Bettina. 1997. Informed Traders, Intervention, and Price Leadership: A Deeper View of 
the Microstructure of the Foreign Exchange Market, Journal of Finance 52:4, 1589–1614. 
Rubin, Robert and Jacob Weisberg. 2003. In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall 
Street to Washington. Random House Publishers, November 2003. 
Sarno, Lucio and Mark Taylor. 2001. Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it 
Effective and, If So, How Does it Work? Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 839-868. 
Taylor, Mark. 2003. Is Official Exchange Rate Intervention Effective? CEPR DP No. 3758. 
Vitale, Paolo. 1999. Sterilized Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, 
Journal of International Economics 49:2, 245–67. 
31
ECB





Table 1: Actual interventions, 1990-2003 
 
all buy FX sell FX all buy FX sell FX all buy FX sell FX
Magnitude of interventions (average, USD million)
1990 - 2003 284 202 323 1554 1697 223 1591 2589 617
   1990 - 1994 203 125 242 385 427 223 1709 2811 634
   1995 - 1998 821 833 819 1706 1706  -- 419 419  --
   1999 - 2003 1500 1500  -- 3192 3192  -- n/a  -- n/a
Number of intervention days
1990 - 2003 84 27 57 278 251 27 87 43 44
   1990 - 1994 74 25 49 131 104 27 79 39 40
   1995 - 1998 9 1 8 59 59 0 4 4 0
   1999 - 2003 1 1 0 88 88 0 4 0 4
Japan




Sources: US Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, Bundesbank, Reuters. 
Note: Amounts for the actual interventions of the ECB were not announced. The numbers used here are 




Table 2: Exchange rate communication, 1990-2003 
 
strengthen weaken strengthen weaken strengthen weaken
Number of interventions
1990 - 2003 125 30 66 71 77 37
   1990 - 1994 18 15 34 16 13 4
   1995 - 1998 31 5 16 4 3 15
   1999 - 2003 76 10 16 51 61 18
USA Japan euro area
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Table 3: Impact effect of interventions on spot exchange rate 
 
coef. std.error coef. std.error
A.  US dollar - euro exchange rate
US oral intervention  IO
US -0.144 ** 0.072 -0.026 * 0.014
Ge/EA oral intervention  IO
GE/EA 0.216 ** 0.101 -0.031 ** 0.014
US actual intervention  IA
US -0.505 0.309 0.044 0.052
Ge/EA actual intervention  IA





B.  Yen - US dollar exchange rate
US oral intervention  IO
US 0.143 *** 0.067 -0.016 * 0.008
Ja oral intervention  IO
JA -0.142 *** 0.051 -0.007 0.016
US actual intervention  IA
US 1.150 *** 0.390 0.398 0.298
Ja actual intervention  IA










Notes:   ***,**,* indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
1   Results are based on EGARCH model with controlling for macroeconomic news, as outlined in the text. 
2  Interest rate differential for US dollar - euro exchange rate is the difference of 3-month money market 
rates in the United States minus the one in the euro area, and correspondingly for the yen - US dollar 
exchange rate. 
3   LR test is test whether model with intervention variables has a higher explanatory power than the model 
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coef. std.error coef. std.error coef. std.error
US oral intervention  IO
US 0.219 ** 0.109 0.008 0.041 0.005 0.005
Ge/EA oral intervention  IO
GE/EA 0.119 * 0.056 0.013 0.023 -0.001 0.006
Ja oral intervention  IO
JA -0.050 0.168 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.007
US actual intervention  IA
US 0.198 * 0.091 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004
Ge/EA actual intervention  IA
GE/EA -0.094 0.154 0.004 0.005 -0.015 0.065
Ja actual intervention  IA
JA 0.154 0.091 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
long interest rates equity market short interest rates
 
 
Notes:   ***,**,* indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, 90% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Events of combined US and euro area oral interventions 
end date # of days # of inter- event
of event in event ventions type
1 before during after
18 April 1990 1 1 -1 -0.316 0.377 -0.030
02 July 1990 1 1 -1 0.680 0.527 0.679
17 October 1990 6 3 -1 1.244 0.984 0.867
09 November 1990 1 1 -1 -0.067 0.202 0.202
03 December 1990 1 1 1 0.568 -1.057 -0.366
31 December 1990 2 2 -1 0.425 2.274 0.034
14 February 1991 7 3 1 0.446 -0.707 -0.914
02 April 1991 1 1 -1 1.905 0.871 0.329
04 June 1991 2 2 1 -1.263 -0.143 -0.114
20 June 1991 2 2 -1 -1.102 1.341 -0.584
12 July 1991 1 1 -1 -1.172 2.572 2.686
18 December 1991 1 1 -1 0.241 0.255 1.125
16 January 1992 5 2 1 -3.397 -3.720 2.323
24 April 1992 1 1 -1 0.060 0.727 0.575
22 July 1992 11 3 -1 1.409 0.331 0.303
10 August 1992 1 1 -1 0.695 0.205 -0.034
30 October 1992 1 1 1 0.467 -0.130 -1.943
28 April 1993 1 1 1 -0.867 -0.032 0.095
09 June 1993 4 2 1 -0.094 -2.117 -0.288
01 July 1993 1 1 -1 -1.160 0.767 0.678
04 October 1993 8 3 -1 0.890 0.325 0.400
14 January 1994 1 1 -1 -0.965 0.074 0.074
16 May 1994 12 3 1 0.484 -0.702 -0.089
22 July 1994 23 5 1 1.131 -0.263 0.044
05 October 1994 3 3 1 -0.264 0.493 0.292
21 October 1994 2 2 1 0.066 0.169 -0.067
22 November 1994 1 1 -1 -0.584 0.071 0.199
09 March 1995 5 3 1 1.414 3.400 -1.286
17 April 1995 5 2 -1 -2.334 2.979 2.845
11 May 1995 1 1 1 -0.504 -3.073 -4.118
25 October 1995 32 6 1 0.340 5.800 0.230
07 December 1995 1 1 1 -0.713 -0.159 -0.290
22 January 1996 2 2 1 -0.190 -0.215 0.223
19 March 1996 2 2 1 -0.068 -0.047 0.136
15 April 1996 1 1 1 -0.120 -0.575 -0.345
28 June 1996 2 2 1 0.131 0.166 -0.374
23 July 1996 1 1 1 0.141 -0.342 -0.248
29 October 1996 10 2 -1 -0.714 1.986 0.517
14 November 1996 1 1 1 0.066 -0.199 -0.238
02 December 1996 2 2 1 0.000 -1.822 -1.124
27 February 1997 19 4 1 -0.165 -2.929 0.017
07 April 1997 8 3 1 0.077 -1.418 -1.726
25 April 1997 2 2 1 0.157 -0.805 -1.016
21 May 1997 5 2 1 -0.029 0.119 -1.139
24 September 1997 9 3 1 1.011 0.467 1.960
02 December 1997 1 1 -1 -0.708 0.090 0.400
21 January 1998 1 1 -1 -0.163 1.072 1.923
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23 February 1998 1 1 -1 -0.258 1.364 1.341
19 March 1998 1 1 -1 -0.438 -0.327 -0.301
14 April 1998 1 1 -1 0.000 1.238 1.289
25 May 1998 6 2 1 -0.337 1.467 -0.656
07 September 1998 1 1 1 -0.231 0.000 0.115
08 October 1998 9 2 1 -0.292 2.671 -1.241
10 November 1998 1 1 -1 -0.913 0.297 0.638
12 January 1999 7 3 1 0.000 -1.322 1.444
04 February 1999 3 3 -1 -0.493 0.284 -0.389
19 March 1999 12 4 1 -0.430 0.091 -0.583
08 April 1999 4 2 1 -0.063 -0.312 0.186
09 August 1999 68 20 1 1.261 -0.263 -0.446
29 September 1999 16 7 1 -0.245 0.621 1.510
29 October 1999 10 4 1 1.058 -3.199 0.019
07 February 2000 51 15 1 -0.343 -3.395 0.366
23 February 2000 1 1 1 1.807 0.010 -1.017
20 March 2000 1 1 1 0.051 0.093 -0.802
07 June 2000 43 9 1 -0.376 0.974 0.273
07 July 2000 1 1 1 -0.178 -0.588 -0.073
20 September 2000 13 3 1 1.442 -6.195 0.906
07 December 2000 1 1 1 1.324 -0.179 -1.189
19 February 2001 2 2 -1 -1.340 1.038 -0.443
14 June 2001 46 9 1 -0.101 -2.781 0.737
25 July 2001 1 1 1 0.506 0.790 0.510
17 August 2001 3 2 1 1.091 1.639 0.219
10 September 2001 1 1 1 1.363 -1.019 0.408
22 October 2001 8 2 -1 -0.301 -2.133 -0.984
17 December 2001 28 7 -1 -0.256 0.750 -0.061
18 February 2002 32 6 -1 -0.465 -2.908 0.378
12 March 2002 1 1 -1 0.246 0.017 0.000
11 April 2002 12 4 -1 -0.017 0.630 0.068
02 May 2002 1 1 1 0.644 -0.359 1.208
21 May 2002 1 1 -1 0.043 -0.174 0.521
29 July 2002 37 8 -1 0.841 3.631 -0.233
17 September 2002 2 2 -1 -1.009 0.243 0.852
17 January 2003 36 7 -1 0.323 7.177 0.415
05 March 2003 22 8 -1 0.162 1.670 0.091
14 April 2003 18 5 -1 -0.658 1.872 0.432




1  Type of event is equal to 1 if interventions go towards strengthening the US dollar, and -1 
otherwise. As discussed in detail in the text, the pre- and post-event window for exchange rate changes 
is 5 days. 
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Table 7: Events of combined US and Japanese oral interventions 
 
end date # of days # of inter- event
of event in event ventions type
1 before during after
23 February 1990 1 1 1 -0.815 -0.279 -1.379
19 March 1990 5 2 1 -0.817 -0.276 -1.038
18 April 1990 2 2 1 0.000 -0.183 1.740
13 July 1990 1 1 1 0.519 -0.415 -0.590
24 September 1990 1 1 1 0.619 -0.371 0.000
17 October 1990 2 2 1 1.020 1.703 1.726
18 February 1991 9 3 -1 0.809 -0.761 -0.678
15 April 1991 30 8 1 -0.539 0.814 1.268
04 June 1991 1 1 -1 -0.650 0.222 -0.097
12 July 1991 1 1 -1 -0.125 1.717 1.304
08 October 1991 9 2 -1 0.080 2.319 -0.465
11 November 1991 1 1 -1 -0.299 0.000 0.378
29 November 1991 1 1 -1 0.000 0.156 -0.039
18 December 1991 1 1 1 -0.077 0.115 0.193
21 February 1992 31 10 -1 -1.268 -2.435 -0.386
15 May 1992 16 4 -1 -0.496 3.723 1.015
12 June 1992 6 2 -1 -0.026 0.667 -0.253
22 July 1992 11 3 1 0.162 -2.085 -1.166
10 August 1992 1 1 -1 -0.026 -0.192 -0.294
01 September 1992 1 1 -1 0.222 0.098 -0.074
30 September 1992 7 3 1 0.610 3.001 -0.406
30 October 1992 6 2 1 1.150 -2.022 -0.419
02 April 1993 1 1 -1 0.792 0.080 0.171
28 April 1993 8 2 1 0.939 -0.150 0.379
01 July 1993 26 4 1 0.688 0.890 -1.285
13 August 1993 2 2 -1 1.173 1.585 1.338
23 September 1993 1 1 -1 0.405 0.233 0.329
14 January 1994 7 2 -1 -0.180 1.693 0.670
28 February 1994 1 1 1 0.431 0.188 0.147
16 May 1994 12 3 1 0.972 -3.462 0.409
22 July 1994 23 6 1 1.692 1.368 0.357
05 October 1994 5 4 1 -0.707 -0.707 -0.149
25 October 1994 3 2 1 0.214 0.358 0.272
09 November 1994 1 1 1 0.224 -0.763 -0.709
09 March 1995 5 3 1 1.684 4.864 0.439
03 May 1995 23 5 1 3.512 3.334 -0.451
19 July 1995 1 1 1 0.622 1.048 0.088
03 October 1995 8 2 1 3.777 -2.488 -0.632
05 December 1995 1 1 1 -0.162 0.121 0.000
22 January 1996 2 2 1 -0.053 -0.159 -0.253
19 March 1996 2 2 1 -0.285 -0.308 -0.339
28 June 1996 2 2 1 -0.458 -0.232 -0.371
23 July 1996 1 1 1 0.443 -0.399 -0.946
29 October 1996 1 1 -1 -0.737 -0.103 0.103
14 November 1996 1 1 -1 -0.212 0.279 0.548
20 February 1997 14 3 1 0.280 -0.855 0.933
07 April 1997 8 3 1 -0.334 -1.238 -1.591
25 April 1997 1 1 1 -0.025 -0.190 -0.656
21 May 1997 5 2 1 1.151 2.466 -3.005
18 September 1997 5 2 1 -0.357 -1.986 -1.100
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22 December 1997 15 4 -1 -0.818 -1.030 0.039
21 January 1998 11 2 -1 -0.040 4.987 1.002
23 February 1998 1 1 -1 -1.399 -0.064 -0.128
30 April 1998 31 5 -1 -0.953 -2.198 -0.808
26 May 1998 7 3 1 -0.696 -2.339 -1.141
08 July 1998 1 1 1 1.122 -0.558 -1.705
07 September 1998 7 2 1 1.556 5.754 1.218
12 October 1998 11 4 1 -0.985 14.219 -1.902
10 November 1998 1 1 -1 -2.179 -0.538 0.000
12 January 1999 2 2 1 0.089 -1.452 -3.903
03 February 1999 2 2 -1 1.129 1.903 0.011
23 March 1999 7 3 1 0.489 0.511 0.177
18 August 1999 88 24 1 1.035 4.895 2.120
29 September 1999 16 7 1 -0.813 3.385 -0.074
29 October 1999 4 3 1 0.370 1.152 0.946
04 February 2000 50 15 1 2.878 -5.305 -0.958
18 April 2000 7 3 1 -0.702 0.686 -0.366
22 May 2000 1 1 1 1.575 -0.032 0.385
07 July 2000 1 1 1 -0.396 -0.540 0.215
20 September 2000 10 2 1 -0.212 -0.696 0.342
13 October 2000 1 1 1 0.140 -0.291 -0.699
01 December 2000 1 1 1 0.712 -0.745 -0.653
16 January 2001 5 4 -1 -0.638 -0.760 -0.063
19 February 2001 2 2 -1 0.597 -0.190 0.009
20 April 2001 7 2 1 -0.256 1.912 -0.099
22 May 2001 6 3 -1 -0.867 0.431 2.174
14 June 2001 6 2 1 0.062 -0.965 -0.691
25 July 2001 1 1 1 0.201 0.443 0.348
17 August 2001 3 2 1 0.402 1.240 -0.398
10 September 2001 1 1 1 0.654 -0.758 0.200
16 October 2001 1 1 1 0.219 -0.381 -0.322
12 November 2001 1 1 1 0.461 -0.021 -0.918
21 December 2001 5 2 1 -0.994 -1.756 -0.835
31 January 2002 10 3 -1 -0.513 -1.666 -0.169
11 March 2002 1 1 1 -0.680 0.288 -0.449
11 April 2002 12 4 1 0.173 1.228 -0.932
03 June 2002 27 9 1 0.695 3.940 -0.016
10 July 2002 17 10 1 -0.080 5.378 0.819
17 September 2002 2 2 -1 -1.282 -0.354 0.733
28 October 2002 1 1 -1 0.141 0.825 0.995
19 December 2002 9 2 1 1.056 2.414 0.415
27 January 2003 10 4 1 0.332 0.353 -0.683
20 March 2003 26 8 1 -0.284 0.973 -1.151
14 April 2003 3 2 -1 -0.329 -0.228 0.179




1  Type of event is equal to 1 if interventions go towards strengthening the US dollar, and -1 
otherwise. As discussed in detail in the text, the pre- and post-event window for exchange rate changes 
is 5 days. 
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Table 8: Events of combined US and euro area actual interventions 
 
end date # of days # of inter- event
of event in event ventions type
1 before during after
04 January 1990 4 1 -1 -0.001 0.728 2.196
07 March 1990 4 4 -1 -0.988 1.089 0.177
30 May 1990 2 2 1 0.000 -0.028 -1.308
17 July 1990 21 15 1 0.787 1.972 0.504
12 February 1991 7 7 1 0.409 1.070 -1.284
27 March 1991 13 7 -1 -1.497 -8.645 -1.315
25 April 1991 3 3 -1 -1.504 0.777 -0.086
21 May 1991 3 2 -1 -0.502 -1.048 0.639
10 June 1991 1 1 -1 -1.005 0.226 -0.112
16 July 1991 13 4 -1 -0.445 -0.135 -0.251
19 August 1991 1 1 -1 -0.822 -3.262 -1.972
20 July 1992 1 1 1 1.132 -2.240 -2.082
24 August 1992 12 4 1 0.291 5.223 2.085
04 May 1994 4 2 1 0.484 0.493 -1.770
24 June 1994 1 1 1 0.137 1.199 1.358
03 November 1994 2 2 1 0.535 -1.497 -0.040
03 March 1995 2 2 1 -0.150 2.486 2.851
05 April 1995 3 2 1 2.493 0.140 0.291
31 May 1995 1 1 1 -0.864 -1.977 -1.406
15 August 1995 1 1 1 0.265 -2.778 -2.910
22 September 2000 1 1 -1 1.431 2.390 1.853
09 November 2000 5 3 -1 -0.267 0.897 0.503




1  Type of event is equal to 1 if interventions go towards strengthening the US dollar, and -1 
otherwise. As discussed in detail in the text, the pre- and post-event window for exchange rate changes 
is 5 days. 
40
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 528
September 2005 
Table 9: Events of combined US and Japanese actual interventions 
 
end date # of days # of inter- event
of event in event ventions type
1 before during after
18 January 1990 12 3 -1 -0.001 -1.368 -1.345
09 April 1990 32 13 -1 -0.149 -1.182 1.266
15 March 1991 1 1 -1 -0.644 -1.574 -2.844
13 May 1991 1 1 -1 0.406 0.701 1.591
13 June 1991 4 2 -1 -1.005 -1.229 -0.222
19 August 1991 1 1 -1 -0.822 -3.262 -1.972
17 January 1992 1 1 -1 0.629 1.682 1.683
11 March 1992 18 4 -1 0.061 -2.852 0.036
01 April 1992 1 1 -1 0.030 -0.515 -0.092
30 April 1992 4 3 -1 0.727 0.032 1.098
25 June 1992 25 10 -1 -0.866 4.870 0.977
11 August 1992 13 4 -1 0.135 1.133 0.055
07 May 1993 26 17 1 1.069 0.571 -2.083
28 June 1993 24 14 1 0.037 -3.756 0.942
07 September 1993 28 18 1 -1.264 7.878 0.434
04 March 1994 14 9 1 1.466 0.430 -0.598
04 May 1994 27 16 1 -0.454 1.241 -1.770
12 July 1994 17 11 1 1.273 5.311 -0.649
03 November 1994 56 19 1 0.373 2.227 -0.040
18 April 1995 43 34 1 1.302 9.868 -0.146
31 May 1995 1 1 1 -0.864 -1.977 -1.406
07 July 1995 8 2 1 0.303 -0.431 -1.190
15 August 1995 10 3 1 0.734 -6.944 -2.910
22 September 1995 13 3 1 0.000 2.808 -0.802
27 February 1996 6 5 1 0.000 0.188 -1.113
18 November 1997 12 5 -1 -0.464 -0.194 -0.046
19 December 1997 3 3 -1 -0.270 0.299 -0.354
10 April 1998 2 2 -1 1.240 -0.510 -0.017
17 June 1998 1 1 -1 0.640 0.672 0.250
12 February 1999 1 1 1 -0.874 0.543 0.543
05 July 1999 18 4 1 0.096 -2.251 0.010
21 July 1999 2 2 1 0.981 2.317 0.999
14 September 1999 3 2 1 -0.509 -1.800 -0.125
30 November 1999 2 2 1 -0.343 -0.631 -0.158
04 January 2000 8 2 1 0.624 1.557 0.477
15 March 2000 5 2 1 0.135 0.780 0.372
03 April 2000 1 1 1 -0.498 0.115 0.680
28 September 2001 10 7 1 0.000 0.094 -0.703
04 June 2002 10 4 1 -0.174 2.176 -0.165
28 June 2002 5 3 1 0.617 2.112 0.304
29 January 2003 11 8 1 0.147 2.516 -0.069
10 March 2003 11 9 1 -0.494 2.618 0.304
26 May 2003 35 18 1 -0.433 10.509 -0.236
16 July 2003 10 9 1 -0.307 -3.462 0.421
30 September 2003 23 12 1 0.110 6.925 0.955




1  Type of event is equal to 1 if interventions go towards strengthening the US dollar, and -1 
otherwise. As discussed in detail in the text, the pre- and post-event window for exchange rate changes 
is 5 days. 
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Table 10: Success criteria of event-study approach 
 
success % success p-value % exchangea% success p-value % exchange
criteria: rate change rate change
event criterion
   oral interventions 75.6% 0.002 0.577% 56.5% 0.168 0.474%
   actual interventions 44.4% 0.760 0.962% 40.0% 0.923 1.146%
direction criterion
   oral interventions 65.1% 0.004 0.466% 65.2% 0.010 0.409%
   actual interventions 66.7% 0.119 0.752% 77.5% 0.003 0.993%
reversal criterion
   oral interventions 62.7% 0.046 2.109% 65.9% 0.030 2.249%
   actual interventions 69.2% 0.133 2.897% 81.3% 0.003 2.780%
smoothing criterion
   oral interventions 88.2% 0.001 2.109% 90.9% 0.001 2.249%
   actual interventions 82.4% 0.006 2.897% 88.6% 0.002 2.780%
combined US and euro area combined US and Japan
 
 
Notes:  The success criteria are defined as in the text and are based on 5-day windows before and after 
the events. The p-values are obtained from a sign test of whether the number of “successes” (n+) is 
larger than the number of “failures” (n–), with the null hypothesis as n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.5) for the 
first three criteria and n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.75) for the smoothing criterion, and with n as the total 
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Table 11: Success criteria of oral interventions by policy mantra 
 
US dollar - euro
success % success p-value % success p-value % success p-value % success p-value
criteria:
event criterion
   oral interventions 55.6% 0.326 85.2% 0.000 76.7% 0.003 74.1% 0.010
direction criterion
   oral interventions 51.1% 0.500 70.4% 0.026 50.0% 0.572 77.8% 0.003
reversal criterion
   oral interventions 34.6% 0.962 75.0% 0.038 47.4% 0.676 83.3% 0.019
smoothing criterion
   oral interventions 80.8% 0.001 88.2% 0.001 68.4% 0.083 80.0% 0.055
with mantra against mantra with mantra against mantra
Euro area oral interventions US oral interventions
 
 
Yen - US dollar
success % success p-value % success p-value % success p-value % success p-value
criteria:
event criterion
   oral interventions 57.7% 0.226 59.3% 0.221 60.4% 0.140 76.0% 0.011
direction criterion
   oral interventions 57.7% 0.186 63.0% 0.124 81.4% 0.000 72.0% 0.022
reversal criterion
   oral interventions 60.0% 0.212 64.7% 0.166 76.9% 0.005 75.0% 0.073
smoothing criterion
   oral interventions 92.0% 0.001 87.5% 0.002 92.3% 0.001 91.7% 0.003
US oral interventions Japanese oral interventions
with mantra against mantra with mantra against mantra
 
 
Notes:  The success criteria are defined as in the text and are based on 5-day windows before and after 
the events. The p-values are obtained from a sign test of whether the number of “successes” (n+) is 
larger than the number of “failures” (n–), with the null hypothesis as n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.5) for the 
first three criteria and n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.75) for the smoothing criterion, and with n as the total 
number of events. 
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Table 12: Success criteria of oral interventions if supported by actual 
interventions 
 
success % success p-value % exchangea% success p-value % exchange
criteria: rate change rate change
event criterion
   oral interventions 83.3% 0.100 0.494% 66.7% 0.076 0.729%
direction criterion
   oral interventions 66.7% 0.154 0.826% 81.1% 0.002 0.096%
reversal criterion
   oral interventions 60.0% 0.500 2.440% 76.3% 0.009 2.214%
smoothing criterion
   oral interventions 80.0% 0.004 2.440% 88.2% 0.012 2.214%
combined US and euro area combined US and Japan
 
 
Notes:  The success criteria are defined as in the text and are based on 5-day windows before and after 
the events. The p-values are obtained from a sign test of whether the number of “successes” (n+) is 
larger than the number of “failures” (n–), with the null hypothesis as n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.5) for the 
first three criteria and n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.75) for the smoothing criterion, and with n as the total 
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Table 13: Success criteria of oral interventions if not supported by 
monetary policy 
 
success % success p-value % exchangea% success p-value % exchange
criteria: rate change rate change
event criterion
   oral interventions 74.7% 0.001 0.541% 58.1% 0.096 0.038%
direction criterion
   oral interventions 63.3% 0.015 0.441% 65.1% 0.004 0.384%
reversal criterion
   oral interventions 60.9% 0.092 2.138% 70.8% 0.003 2.174%
smoothing criterion
   oral interventions 93.3% 0.000 1.770% 88.2% 0.003 0.019%
combined US and euro area combined US and Japan
 
 
Notes:  The success criteria are defined as in the text and are based on 5-day windows before and after 
the events. The p-values are obtained from a sign test of whether the number of “successes” (n+) is 
larger than the number of “failures” (n–), with the null hypothesis as n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.5) for the 
first three criteria and n+ ~ binomial (n, p = 0.75) for the smoothing criterion, and with n as the total 
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Table 14: Determin
ants of success of 
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Table 14: Determin
ants of success of comm













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No. 528
September 2005 
Figure 1: USD-EUR exchange rate movements around events (40 
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Figure 2: Cumulated impulse respons
es
 of US and euro area interv
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Figure 3: Cumulated impulse respons
es
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Figure 4: Cumulated impulse responses of selected macroeconomic 
news, USD-EUR exchange rate 
Impulse response: US non-farm payroll employment
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Impulse response: Euro area Ifo business confidence index
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Figure 5: Effect of i
nterventions on for
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